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ABSTRACT
Discriminatory practices in recruitment and hiring are an ongoing
issue that is a concern not just for workplace relations, but also
for wider understandings of economic justice and inequality. The
ability to get and keep a job is a key aspect of participating in
society and sustaining livelihoods. Yet the way decisions are made
on who is eligible for jobs, and why, are rapidly changing with the
advent and growth in uptake of automated hiring systems (AHSs)
powered by data-driven tools. Evidence of the extent of this uptake
around the globe is scarce, but a recent report estimated that 98%
of Fortune 500 companies use Applicant Tracking Systems of some
kind in their hiring process, a trend driven by perceived efficiency
measures and cost-savings. Key concerns about such AHSs include
the lack of transparency and potential limitation of access to jobs
for specific profiles. In relation to the latter, however, several of
these AHSs claim to detect and mitigate discriminatory practices
against protected groups and promote diversity and inclusion at
work. Yet whilst these tools have a growing user-base around the
world, such claims of ‘bias mitigation’ are rarely scrutinised and
evaluated, and when done so, have almost exclusively been from a
US socio-legal perspective.
In this paper, we introduce a perspective outside the US by criti-
cally examining how three prominent automated hiring systems
(AHSs) in regular use in the UK, HireVue, Pymetrics and Applied,
understand and attempt to mitigate bias and discrimination. These
systems have been chosen as they explicitly claim to address issues
of discrimination in hiring and, unlike many of their competitors,
provide some information about how their systems work that can
inform an analysis. Using publicly available documents, we describe
how their tools are designed, validated and audited for bias, high-
lighting assumptions and limitations, before situating these in the
socio-legal context of the UK. The UK has a very different legal back-
ground to the US in terms not only of hiring and equality law, but
also in terms of data protection (DP) law. We argue that this might
be important for addressing concerns about transparency and could
mean a challenge to building bias mitigation into AHSs definitively
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capable of meeting EU legal standards. This is significant as these
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than improve systemic discrimination in the workplace.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The use of data systems and automated decision-making as a way
to monitor, allocate, assess and manage labour is a growing feature
of the contemporary workplace. Of increasing significance is the
way Human Resources, and hiring practices in particular, are be-
ing transformed through various forms of automation and the use
of data-driven technologies which we will collectively term Auto-
mated Hiring Systems (AHSs) [15, 41, 48]. Whilst there is a lack of
data on the global uptake of such technologies, a recent report esti-
mated that 98% of Fortune 500 companies use Applicant Tracking
Systems of some kind in their hiring process [45]. The so-called ‘hir-
ing funnel’ [15] consists of sourcing, screening, interviewing, and
selection/rejection as a set of progressive filtering stages to identify
and recruit the most suitable candidates. Each of these stages are
undergoing forms of automation, as part of not only perceived
efficiency measures and cost-savings that data-driven technologies
afford, but also as a means to detect and mitigate discriminatory
practices against protected groups and promoting diversity and
inclusion at work [15]. Hiring platforms such as PeopleStrong or
TribePad implement basic measures to mitigate human unconscious
biases, such as anonymisation of candidates, while other platforms
such as HireVue, Pymetrics and Applied1 claim to specifically tackle
1Note that Applied does not automate the evaluation of candidates but it assists in the
process of bias discovery and mitigation.
FAT* ’20, January 27–30, 2020, Barcelona, Spain Javier Sánchez-Monedero, Lina Dencik, and Lilian Edwards
the problem of discrimination in hiring. Yet the basis upon which
such claims are made is rarely scrutinised and evaluated. While
algorithmic bias generally and in employment law specifically [14]
has had extensive investigation in the FAT* community, literature
on bias mitigation in AHSs is at an early stage and so far primarily
focused on the US context of employment both socially and legally
[7, 15, 40]. We know much less about how this phenomena is devel-
oping in Europe [8]. This is the first scholarly attempt to consider
the question of how satisfactorily bias and discrimination might be
mitigated in AHSs within the UK context.2
We start by outlining how data-driven technologies are trans-
forming hiring practices, before turning to focus on three AHSs
widely in use in the UK which make claims to deal with bias and
whose claims could be evaluated using publicly available materi-
als such as company white papers and reports, patents, marketing
resources, seminars and, in one case, source code. Access to fur-
ther information relating to code, data sets, features design, trained
models, or even the application user interface was not possible,
and will often vary depending on client. Based on this publicly
available material that outline their technological and procedural
frameworks, we examine how these products implement bias dis-
covery and mitigation. In doing so, and in building on recent work
in this area [5, 15, 40, 48] we explore the assumptions made about
the meaning of bias and discrimination in hiring practices embed-
ded within these tools. The three prominent systems we examined
were Pymetrics, HireVue and Applied. For each of these, we outline
the design of the tool, focusing on how bias in hiring is addressed.
The first two of these come from the US, and the third, Applied,
from the UK, for comparative purposes. Other UK systems were
considered but either made no claims as to debiasing, or did not
make available sufficient public material to analyse. Although not
rigorously addressed, this gap, either in implementation of debi-
asing, or its disclosure, is in itself, we feel, a significant finding
deserving further research.
Next we briefly discuss the background to UK and EU equal-
ity law in the context of employment. Importantly, we raise the
point that in the EU, all natural persons whose personal data is
processed are given data rights, including rights to transparency
and protection against power imbalance, which may be as useful
in combating bias in AHSs as employment equality rights; these
data protection (DP) rights, ensconced in the EU General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR), are not found in omnibus fashion in
the US and thus have largely not been analysed in the US hiring
algorithm literature.
In analysing these systems, we started from the premise that
there is no singular or unified way of interpreting the meaning
of discrimination, or how it might feature in hiring practices, nor
is there consensus on any computational criteria for how “bias”
should be defined, made explicit, or mitigated [22, 37, 40, 47, 54].
Ongoing analysis point out issues such as the unsuitability of maths
2In this paper we are not looking at the general scientific validation of the system
design as we do not have access to any independent studies of that kind. Instead,
we are focusing on how ‘bias’ and discrimination is understood in the design. Our
assessment does therefore not directly engage with the effectiveness of using AHSs to
evaluate candidates, even though issues of discrimination would be very pertinent in
such an assessment.
to capture the full meaning of social concepts such as fairness, es-
pecially in a general sense, or the risk of technological solutionism
[43]. Even when considering one statistical definition for bias such
as the error rate balance amongst groups, the understanding and
implication of that approach radically varies with the context and
the consequential decisions that are driven by the algorithmic out-
put [26]. Also, all sociotechnical systems, even when designed to
mitigate biases, are designed with use cases in mind that may not
hold in all scenarios [43]. Moreover, fairness can be procedural, as
in the equal treatment of individuals, or substantive, as in the equal
impact on groups [14], what is also referred to as opportunity-based
vs. outcome-based notions of bias. These do not necessarily align
and may actually be contradictory [33].
We conclude by arguing that, while common practices may be
emerging to mitigate bias in AHSs built in the US, these are in-
evitably likely to reflect US legal and societal conceptions of bias
and discrimination, and yet are exported wholesale as products
to UK and other markets beyond the US. If this mismatch is not
explicitly disclosed and analysed, there is a patent danger that inap-
propriate US-centric values and laws relating to bias in hiring (and
more generally in society) may be exported to UK workplaces. Data
protection rights, such as the alleged “right to an explanation” may
by contrast not be implemented, potentially rendering useless the
rights of candidates. What is more, while biased workplace hiring
practices in traditional modes of hiring may at least to some extent
be evident, and combatted in traditional ways by unions, strategic
litigation and regulators, there are severe dangers that such biases
buried within “black box” AHSs may not be manifestly obvious
and so remain unchallenged. As AHSs become ever more popular,
especially in sectors which are precarious, such as retail and the
gig economy where prospective employees (or contractors) may
have little economic power or knowledge of rights [7, 15], this is,
we argue, a serious problem.
2 THE DATA-DRIVEN HIRING FUNNEL
The automation of hiring is an important part of the broader discus-
sion on the future of work, subject to a range of ethical concerns
and issues of fairness across the different stages of the hiring fun-
nel, from sourcing to screening to interviewing to selection [15].
At each of these stages, the increasing use of data to automate or
partially automate the process is significantly changing the way de-
cisions are made on who is eligible for jobs, and why. Recommender
engines based on hybrid collaborative filtering methods are used to
capture user (both job seekers and recruiters) preferences; tools are
used to filter candidates and identify the most promising candidates;
automated skills tests and video interviews evaluate candidates;
and analytics dashboards are used to select candidates and generate
ad hoc job offers [48]. Data is collected from a range of sources and
can be self-reported by the candidate in the form of unstructured
documents such as resumés or as structured professional network
profiles or online application forms. Often this information will be
extended and/or scored through additional sources of information
and assessment tests.
Central to the hiring process, only made more salient with au-
tomation, is the goal of hiring for ‘fit’ with an organisation, a cri-
terion that leverages the employer significant discretion and may
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only be useful if an employer can make an accurate determination
of such a fit [5]. The algorithmic specification of such a fit often
relies on abstracting candidate profiles in relation to historical data
of the company and/or top performers for specific roles. That is,
at each stage of the hiring process, tools are designed around a
set of variables, optimized for a particular criteria as to who might
constitute an appropriate and ‘good’ employee. Deciding on such a
criteria has long been imbued with the potential for discriminatory
practices, and the aim here is not to suggest that those practices
have only emerged with the introduction of data-driven tools nor
is it to further the construct of a (false) binary between human vs.
automated decision-making. Rather, in line with Ajunwa [5], we
see value in addressing issues that such tools have made salient
with the understanding that technologies are the product of human
action and that, as Wajcman puts it, “histories of discrimination
live on in digital platforms and become part of the logic of everyday
algorithmic systems.” [57].
At the same time, the turn to AHSs is significant also for the
potential scale of impact, the difficulty with interrogating decision-
making, increasing information asymmetry between labour and
management, the standardisation of techniques, the obfuscation of
accountability, and the veneer of objectivity that such technologies
often afford employers, despite evidence of discrimination at each
stage of the data-driven hiring funnel. For instance, when sourcing,
specific groups have been found excluded from viewing job ads
based on age [10] or gender [12]. Masculine gendered language in
job descriptions can discourage women to apply for certain type of
jobs [24] whilst language used by candidates has been demonstrated
to be a proxy for social class that impact on the chances of being se-
lected for an interview [50]. As such, screening of candidates based
on collaborative filtering can perpetuate existing discriminatory
practices [15]. Even when a recommendation engine is generally
not discriminating against women, some job titles and rank results
can place men in better positions [18]. Automated interviews, in-
cluding the use of speech and facial recognition software, has been
shown to perform poorly, particularly with regards to women of
colour [15, 16]. Moreover, using ‘cultural fit’ as part of the selection
criterion has been shown to lead to exclusive hiring practices, and
is now outlawed by some companies as part of an effort to decrease
unconscious bias [5]. These findings are part of a broader debate
that engages with the way data-driven technologies systematically
introduce and entrench forms of discrimination and social and
economic inequality [9, 35, 36, 38, 47].
The role that AHSs come to play in entrenching and furthering
the information asymmetry between labour and management in-
herent in the hiring process, the increased lack of accountability
in decision-making, and the advancement of a global standard of
management techniques changes the terms of control in the work-
place; what Ajunwa [4] refers to as ‘platform authoritarianism’
in which employers gain penetrating new insights into current or
potential employees, but the latter have no room to negotiate. What
is more, the reliance on what are often candidate profiles based on
incomplete data, proxies and inferences, may further this sense of
authoritarianism on the basis of incomplete or inaccurate profiles.
Similarly, Moore [34] argues that the on-going quantification of
the workplace comes to discipline workers as they continuously
seek to adapt to the needs of the technologies in place to assess
them in a process of ‘self-quantification’. Importantly, who might
be best positioned to adapt to such measures and who is likely
to be excluded rarely forms part of approaches to bias mitigation.
Instead, the focus of mitigation tends to be on the technicalities
of the model, at the point of the interface, situating the relation-
ship between discrimination and inequality within the confines of
‘unconscious bias’.
Of course, asking providers of AHSs to attend to the dynamics
of power in labour relations and society more broadly might seem
unnecessarily burdensome, but by not recognising the broader func-
tions of automation in shaping those dynamics when considering
forms of bias mitigation, we run the risk of neutralising challenges
in a way that actively facilitates discrimination and inequality un-
der a banner of fairness [20, 23, 28]. This is particularly important
as these companies are part of standardising not only managerial
techniques [7], but also how we should both understand and ‘solve’
the problem of discrimination in hiring, within a potentially global
market.
3 TECHNOLOGICAL BIAS AUDITING AND
MITIGATION IN HIRING
The data-driven hiring funnel therefore demands attention and
scrutiny, particularly in relation to issues of discrimination and
rights. This is especially pertinent as a number of AHSs specifically
claim to address bias and discrimination in hiring, and seek to do
so across organisational and national contexts. The claim is that
automation reduces hirer bias, replacing messy human decisions
with a neutral technical process [7]. In this section, we introduce
three such software systems that specifically address the issue of
bias in hiring. These AHSs were selected as they are known to
be used in the UK, and, unlike many of their competitors, there
is publicly available information to inform an evaluation of their
approach. We base this evaluation on what documents are available
through their websites and registered patents. The complete models
or design of the tools, or outlines of specific data sources, have not
been available to us for auditing and will vary depending on the
client.
3.1 Pymetrics
Pymetrics is a vendor of hiring technology that performs a pre-
employment assessment of candidates with games tests that are
based on neuroscience research3. By analysing how participants
behave with these games, the software generates metrics of cog-
nitive, social and emotional traits. The profile is evaluated with a
statistical model trained on the game results of top performers in
each role so that the model can calculate a score and categorize
the candidate as out-of-group and in-group [39]. This fit-to-role
score is an aggregation of the scores of the individual tests. To
create a description of optimal traits values for a professional role,
the system uses an unsupervised learning clustering algorithm to
identify representative scores of traits for the reference workers.
For instance, according to Pymetrics [58], one of the desired char-
acteristics of the best performing software developers are ‘delayed
gratification’ and ‘learning’, that are two of the characteristics of
a person that the software can measure (see Figure 1). A person
3https://www.pymetrics.com/
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with a good score in these characteristics is more likely to fit in the
position.
Figure 1: Pymetrics software engineer profile of traits.
Screenshot from Pymetrics seminar recording available in
[58].
Pymetrics features bias mitigation in candidate assessment based
on the game design that is intended to avoid score correlation with
protected groups and be agnostic with respect to non-verbal com-
munication and culture [58]. To evaluate the fairness of each game
score and of the fit-to-role score, Pymetrics performs statistical
tests to compare both the individual and aggregated scores with
respect to candidates grouped by age, gender and ethnicity. Since
each game produces one to ten metrics, each one of those metrics is
analysed to check for negative impact on protected groups scores.
The Pymetrics’s US patent [39] reports detailed statistical test
results of multiple group comparison. The worker and candidate
data used for the test corresponds to several Pymetrics customers.
The impact of age was analysed by grouping candidates in four age
groups (≤ 29; 30-34; 35-39; and ≥ 40), the impact on gender was
evaluated considering binary gender classes (male; female) and the
impact of race considered eight categories (Asian, Black, Hispanic,
Middle Eastern, Native American, White, other, and mixed race).
The multivariate ANOVA and Hotelling’s T-squared tests concluded
that for each game none of the tasks showed significant differences
by ethnic group and a subset of the tasks showed different scores
based on age and gender. When comparing the final score that
assesses the suitability of a person for a position, the multivariate
statistical analyses concluded that there were no differences, statis-
tical bias, between samples groups by age (p>0.05), gender (p>0.05)
and race (p>>0.1).
Pymetrics developed a specific tool, audit-AI, to perform this
auditing and released it as open source software4. The software
also performs US regulatory compliance checks to comply to fair
standard treatment of all protected groups indicated in the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) [52]. The EEOC requires
that the ratio of the proportion of pass rates, selection of candidates
in this context, of the highest-passing and lowest-passing demo-
graphic categories has to follow the 4/5ths rule, meaning the ratio
comparing the two extreme cases cannot be smaller than 0.80. For
4https://github.com/pymetrics/audit-ai
example, if there are 1,000 candidates who were hired and they
belong to three groups, A, B and C, with passing frequency of 350,
320 and 330 respectively, the highest and lowest passing groups
are A and B and, so the bias ratio is 320/350, or 0.91. Since this
ratio is greater than 0.80 the selection procedure meets the legal
requirements of the EEOC.
3.2 HireVue
HireVue5 is a product to automate the pre-interview assessment of
candidates from a pool. It performs automated video interview and
games to profile candidates. The games and questions are designed
based on Industrial Organization psychology research. The tool
extracts three types of indicator data from applicants: categorical,
audio and video [49]. HireVue promises to eliminate human bi-
ases in the assessment of candidates whilst simultaneously finding
the subset of candidates that are most likely to be successful in a
job by comparing them to employees already performing that job.
Therefore, the software automates the screening of candidates by
directly selecting them for a later human interview. In contrast to
information provided by Pymetrics, HireVue provides more gen-
eral information about what precise features are extracted from
candidates and the specific statistical definition of bias.
Bias detection is performed by measuring demographic parity
as defined by the US EEOC. To mitigate bias, HireVue has two
strategies:
The first strategy consists of the removal of indicators that have
an adverse impact on protected groups based on previous knowl-
edge. As described in the website documentation [27] and patent
[49], the abstract process first defines performance indicators and
questions to elicit responses that can be measured and related to job
performance. Indicators can include not only what the candidate
says but also how they say it by extracting audio features such
as pitch or duration. Then a model is trained to learn how to pre-
dict the suitability of the candidate from all these indicators. The
bias mitigation consists of evaluating the adverse impact on pro-
tected groups by detecting violation of the 4/5ths rule. Features that
cause biased results are removed and the models are re-trained and
re-evaluated until bias is not detected. As an illustrative example,
HireVue presents the case of speaking slowly as a characteristic
of the top performers in a technical support role that also is more
common in men6. Testing the tool should reveal this correlation so
that the feature will be suppressed from the model input7. Alterna-
tively, according to the patent [49], the bias discovering process can
consist of applying clustering methods to detect protected groups in
the feature space8. Clustering methods are unsupervised learning
algorithms that try to structure unlabelled data points into different
groups based on their arrangement in the input space. In this case,
data points are composed of indicators excluding those ones related
to group and performance. The proposal consists of running these
methods to try to find groups based on the features used to evaluate
candidates. If the method is capable of discovering protected groups
5https://www.hirevue.com/
6https://www.hirevue.com/blog/hirevue-assessments-and-preventing-algorithmic-
bias
7HireVue does not specify how this correlation can be discovered.
8Here we refer to as feature space to input data that consist of features extracted from
candidates.
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in this unsupervised manner, this means that one or more features,
such as weight or hair colour, are correlated with the categorical
variable so that learning algorithms could potentially use these
features to learn to discriminate. If this is the case, the input data
will be examined to identify and remove such correlated features.
The second strategy consists of modifying the learning algo-
rithm to account for fairness. In machine learning, the objective
function is a mathematical expression of how well the model is
fitted to the data. It guides the learning algorithms in the process
of learning from data and creating data transformations that con-
tribute to improving accuracy. The patent [31] proposes to replace
the objective function, typically a global sum of squared errors,
with a corrected function that sums the separate error of the model
for each protected group. By doing so, the objective function incor-
porates a fairness constraint that will indirectly introduce pressure
on the learning algorithm to build a model that considers that the
accuracy of the model with respect to all the protected groups (race,
gender, age, etc.) must be equal. To account for the equal influence
of underrepresented or minority classes, each group error term is
normalized to ensure that the majority class does not influence the
model more than the rest of the classes. The general expression for
corrected error can be written as:
Ecorrected = EA + EB + EC + · · ·
where EA, EB , etc. are the errors for each protected group.
Additionally, the patent proposes to sum a penalty term to the
corrected error to account for the regulations such as the EEOC.
An example term of the 4/5ths rule can be represented as follows:
P (X ) =
{
pm if f (X ) violates 4/5ths rule
0 otherwise
where pm is the cost the user wants to associate with the rule
violation and f (X ) refers to the candidate evaluation model whose
output will be checked for demographic parity. Therefore, the ob-
jective error function becomes:
Ewith_ penalty = Ecorrected + P (X )
3.3 Applied
Applied9 is a hiring platform specialised in promoting diversity
and inclusion in recruitment. The system includes a numerical, an-
alytical and problem-solving testing platform called Mapped10 that
designs the tests by excluding patterns that are found to negatively
impact on different demographic groups and improve pass rates of
candidates of different groups11.
In contrast to Pymetrics and HireVue, it performs bias discovery
and mitigation by providing a de-biasing guide and demographic
analytics reports for the hiring pipeline [11]. Note this tool does
not perform automatic candidate assessmet but it semi-automates
the task of discrimination monitoring. For example, regarding ad-
vertisement, the platform can analyse gendered language use and
inclusiveness of position descriptions (see Figure 2). To ‘remove
bias’ in the rest of the steps, the platform collects demographic
9https://www.beapplied.com
10http://www.get-mapped.com/
11http://www.get-mapped.com/#about
Figure 2: Example of gendered language and inclusion anal-
ysis of Applied. Generated with trial version available at
https://textanalysis.beapplied.com/ and an academic job ad
of a British university.
information and then performs candidate anonymization and re-
moves direct and indirect group information. Applied recommends
to chunk assessment tests and compare results across candidates
rather than performing full reviews of applications. In addition, it
suggests to randomise the order of the chunks and get more than
one person to score each chunk. Rather than performing formal
statistical tests, the platform provides aggregated analytics to eval-
uate the whole process to visually detect biases at different stages
(see Figure 3). Other comparison analytics are chunk scoring for
each group or the degree of scoring agreement between multiple
reviewers.
Figure 3: Visual auditing of bias implemented by Applied.
Source [11].
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4 EVALUATING CLAIMS OF BIAS
MITIGATION
Having outlined the different claims and approaches that our three
AHSs under study provide formitigating bias in hiringwe now draw
on FAT-related debates to briefly sketch some of the limitations of
such approaches.12
With different levels of formalization, the three AHSs understand
fairness in the broader categories identified in recent literature [19]:
(1) anti-classification, the omission of group variables and proxies
in the decision making model, also known as debiasing; (2) classi-
fication parity in terms of equal passing rates; and (3) calibration,
the requirement that outcomes are independent of the group vari-
ables. Notice that all the categories depend on clear definitions of
groups. Examples of group definitions are binary gender, ethnicity
(using definitions informed specifically by US demographics) and
age interval. Social class or disabilities are not found in either the
examples nor in the available validation tests. (2) and (3) depend on
the comparison of an outcome that is ultimately the selection of can-
didates, i.e. passing rates, but also candidate scoring. HireVue and
Pymetrics audit bias by checking the 4/5ths rule (classification par-
ity). Additionally, Pymetrics uses statistical tests to compare group
scores and passing rates which are a common way of comparing
groups represented by samples.
In line with on-going discussions on criteria for fairness in data
systems, notions of bias mitigation in AHSs present some inherent
limitations [15, 40]. One fundamental limitation is that reference
data is, by definition, extracted from current and past employees,
and in many cases from the ‘best performing’ ones. Regardless of
attention to ‘fairness’, the algorithmic specification of ‘best per-
forming’ or its close association best ‘fit’, can itself become a vehicle
for bias [7]. Within this setting, it is not clear that fair evaluation
methods can be built on past data that reflect historical injustices
[15, 40]. In other words, the issue with bias in AHSs may be in
the very logic of prediction itself. Related to this, if the data used
to build and validate the models only incorporates data from em-
ployees in the company and not the rejected candidates, this limits
the use of fairness metrics that consider that discrimination can be
better reflected when accounting for disparate mistreatment [59],
for example by comparing false negative cases, i.e., candidates that
would be suitable employees and were wrongly rejected. Validating
fairness with respect to passing rates (disparate impact), as in true
positives, has been discussed as problematic since it represents the
degree of belief we have in the model prediction with respect to an
individual or group rather than a measure of discrimination [26].
Hellman [26] proposes to compare error ratios instead as a better
measure to compare different treatment of groups, which opens
up a complex discussion about the validity of metrics to compare
groups.
Discrimination with respect to different attributes is partially
covered in the frameworks outlined by the three AHSs under study.
Yet, as is a common feature of bias mitigation, they appear lim-
ited to single-axis understandings of identification that neglects
substantial engagement with intersectional forms of discrimina-
tion [28]. Pymetrics validates fairness of each assessment test by
12This is not intended as an exhaustive list, but merely to highlight key concerns and
debates.
performing multiple group comparisons across each attribute, e.g.
comparing its determined racial groups scorings. Multiple axes of
group identification are not directly compared, e.g. hispanic women
with white men. HireVue, meanwhile, proposes in its patent to cre-
ate a model that mitigates discrimination by modifying a standard
objective function to equally account for the prediction errors of
all the groups and also to penalize solutions that violate the classi-
fication parity constraint. However, this proposal is abstract and
with no validation reports making it difficult to analyse. Moreover,
the idea of adding a set of penalty terms to the objective function
does not necessarily generate useful models. The problem arises in
the fact that adding many terms to these functions will decrease
the influence of each term, causing convergence problems in the
learning algorithm. Indeed, the study of intersectionality and rich
subgroups fairness in ML remains limited and in an early stage
because of the problem of multiple objectives for optimization and
the complexity of expressing the concept of intersectionality in a
mathematical way [13, 16, 29, 59]. In this, understandings of bias
mitigation in AHSs tend to overlook established limits of domi-
nant antidiscrimination discourses that have also featured in legal
debates [28].
These computational limitations of bias mitigation in AHSs point
to several directions that such efforts might take. However, none
of these discussions take account of the different national contexts
in which these systems are being deployed and how different legal
frameworks might apply, despite the prominence of legal defini-
tions in the outline of the system design. In order to illustrate the
significance of this, we now turn to discuss the relevant legal frame-
work for the deployment of such systems in a UK context where
we know they are used, and how the approaches to bias mitigation
they propose relate.
5 LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Raghavan et al’s [40] comprehensive study of automated hiring
systems (AHSs) makes it clear that the majority of such systems on
the market are developed in the US. Exceptions include Applied and
Thrivemap (both UK), Teamscope (Estonia) and ActiView (Israel).
No rigorous evidence seems to be available as to the market share
of systems in actual use across the globe, yet in terms of bias miti-
gation, where the system is developed is crucial. While hiring goals
and values may be universal (itself questionable), legal regulation
of data-driven automated systems is decidedly not. As outlined
above, considerations of bias and its mitigation in US-built systems
– such as Pymetrics and HireView - have clearly aimed at meeting
the constraints of US equality law [14], notably the 4/5ths rule set
by the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) [52]. Yet
UK law (itself heavily permeated by EU law) on equality and dis-
crimination in employment matters is considerably different; most
obviously in the UK there is no 4/5ths rule and hard statistical goals
to (dis)prove bias do not seem formally to exist, in either statute or
case law. It is noticeable that the two US-originated systems make
use of the 4/5ths rule while the UK system discussed (Applied) does
not. Interestingly, also, another UK system used widely, Thrive Map
makes no claims as to bias mitigation at all and is therefore not
included in this paper.
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Furthermore, EUDP law, now codified and reformed in the GDPR,
provides a suite of rights to “data subjects” (natural persons whose
personal data is processed) which are unknown to Federal US law
(although sectoral data rights do exist in the US in health, finance
and some other domains, and significant state laws have been en-
acted eg the Californian Consumer Privacy Act 2018, which repli-
cates many features of EU DP law). DP rights may prove in the
UK/EU context to be as or more important in uncovering or com-
bating bias than sectoral employment or equality rights; yet US
systems may (unsurprisingly) not be optimised to meet these rights.
Turning first to UK discrimination law, similarly to US law, it is
based initially on the idea of a closed list of “protected characteris-
tics”, here laid out in the Equality Act 2010, s 4. UK law also however
(currently - Brexit may change this) has to respect supranational
EU law, which includes a number of Directives relevant to equality
and bias, notably the Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment
Directive 2006/54/EC, the Gender Equality Directive 2004/113/EC
and the Framework Directive for Equal Treatment in Employment
and Occupation 2000/78/EC. Human rights standards under the Eu-
ropean Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) are also relevant and
refers to broader protection against discrimination on any ground
(art 14) in relation to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
ECHR. The EU itself now has as a binding source of law its own
human rights instrument, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
EU [3]. This complex legislative patchwork, divided across com-
mon law and civilian approaches to law-making and interpretation
[30], possibly contributes to fewer “hard and fast” standards for
measuring unlawful bias in UK employment law than in the US,
which itself arguably makes the task of proving debiasing harder
for builders of AHSs for the UK market and may have contributed
to abandoning the effort altogether for some companies.
The UK’s Equality Act 2010 attempts to replace a number of
piecemeal prior laws relating to different types of inequality with
a coherent statute covering inter alia sex, race and disability dis-
crimination. Rather as with US law, discrimination can be direct
or indirect. Direct discrimination in employment is nowadays re-
garded as rare [42]. Indirect discrimination is defined in s 19(1)
as “a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in
relation to a protected characteristic”. Effectively it occurs when a
policy that applies in the same way to everybody has an effect that
particularly disadvantages people with a protected characteristic.
This is similar to the US idea of disparate impact. However the Code
of Practice which accompanies the Equality Act [1] does not lay
down a statistical rule of thumb akin to the 4/5ths rule to prove bias.
Instead, reflecting s 19(2), the Code provides only that a comparison
must be made between workers with the protected characteristic
and those without it. The circumstances of the two groups must be
sufficiently similar for a comparison to be made and there must be
no material differences in circumstances (para 4.15). This “pool for
comparison” consists of the group which the provision, criterion
or practice affects (or would affect) either positively or negatively,
while excluding workers who are not affected by it, either positively
or negatively. Importantly, the guidance does not always require
a formal comparative exercise using statistical evidence. Such an
approach was however adopted by the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union (CJEU) to prove indirect sex discrimination in R v
Secretary for State for Employment es parte Seymour-Smith [2000]
IRLR 263 and is endorsed in some cases by the Equality Act Code
for the UK as below (para 4.21):
“•What proportion of the pool has the particular pro-
tected characteristic?
• Within the pool, does the provision, criterion or
practice affect workers
without the protected characteristic?
• How many of these workers are (or would be) dis-
advantaged by it?
How is this expressed as a proportion (‘x’)?
•Within the pool, how does the provision, criterion
or practice affect
people who share the protected characteristic?
• How many of these workers are (or would be) put
at a disadvantage by it?
How is this expressed as a proportion (‘y’)?
Using this approach, the Employment Tribunal will
then compare (x) with (y).”
However there is no particular prescribed ratio of outcomes that
proves bias. “Whether a difference is significant will depend on the
context, such as the size of the pool and the numbers behind the
proportions. It is not necessary to show that the majority of those
within the pool who share the protected characteristic are placed
at a “disadvantage” (para 4.22). Furthermore according to s 19(2),
bias can be justified if it is shown to be a “proportionate” means
of achieving a “legitimate” aim. Legitimacy is not even defined in
the 2010 Act though guidance can be drawn from the CJEU and
the Code of Practice, which states that the aim of the discrimina-
tory provision, criterion or practice “should be legal, should not
be discriminatory in itself, and must represent a real, objective
consideration”. It adds: “Although reasonable business needs and
economic efficiency may be legitimate aims, an employer solely
aiming to reduce costs cannot expect to satisfy the test” (para 4.29).
Given this kind of language, it is hard to imagine how either pro-
portionality or legitimacy could be coded into a hiring tool. In legal
discourse, proportionality is what is known as an “open textured”
concept: it is impossible to predict what factors will come relevantly
into play in advance, lacking a sufficiently large dataset of case law,
nor how factors would be ranked. Even if sufficient data was avail-
able to mine using ML techniques, we would argue that it would
not contain the individualised policy factors which drive courts or
tribunals to make decisions around proportionality and legitimacy.
by contrast a hard edged heuristic like the 4/5ths rule is simplistic
to implement.
Turning to DP law, all data subjects have a number of rights
in relation to the processing of personal data (itself defined in
GDPR, art 4(1)), including rights to transparency and access to
data held about them (“subject access rights” or SARs)(GDPR, arts
12-15) and to object to decisions which have legal or similarly
significant effects being made about them using their personal data
and by solely automated means (GDPR, art 22). The latter provision
caused great academic stir in 2016 when it was claimed somewhat
controversially it could be interpreted to provide data subjects, not
just with a right to a “human in the loop” as had been known to be
the case (albeit with little publicity) since 1995, but also with a “right
to an explanation” of how the decision was made [21, 25, 55]. Given
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the importance of access to employment, automated hiring systems
almost certainly make a decision which has legal or significant
effect. Indeed, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), which
regulates DP in the UK, gives “e-recruiting practices without human
intervention” as a canonical example for the application of art 2213.
Thus it could be argued that any use of a fully automated AHS,
regardless of whether bias can be proved or is, indeed, said to have
been mitigated, can be refused by the prospective employee on the
ground that it is a solely automated decision under art 22, requiring
explicit consent (art 22(2)(c)) and instead, the candidate could ask
for a human to make that decision instead, or reconsider it. This
rule is augmented further by the fact that it may be impossible to
give valid explicit consent in the context of employment anyhow.
Consent under the GDPR art 4(11) must be “freely given” and the
Art 29 Working Party (A29 WP - now replaced by the European
Data Protection Board or EDPB) who provide persuasive guidance
on the GDPR, have indicated that truly free, and therefore valid,
consent can probably never be given in the context of employment
relations [2]. Of course it could be argued that a hiring (though not
a firing or promotion/demotion) system precedes employment, and
consent can therefore be valid; it seems unlikely the CJEU would
take kindly to this, especially in times of austerity and precarity.
Thus by chain of deduction it seems plausible that it is in fact illegal
to use a solely automated AHS in the EU.
Issues arise with this analysis however. First, anecdotally, very
few hiring (or even firing, promotion, demotion, allocation of hours,
etc.) decisions seem to be taken without any human intervention
at all. To take a recent US example, Amazon came under fire in
April 2019 for apparently automatedly sacking up to 10% a year of
their employees whose productivity fell below certain measured
efficiency levels in environments regarded as highly datafied [32].
However later evidence emerged that no “automatic” sackings in
fact occurred and a human supervisor was always there to reverse
the sacking. Thus art 22 would arguably not have applied. Uber’s
global driver terms and conditions state that automated firings can
take place but then add that in the EU a right to object to a human
is available [51]. This suggests however that mere rubber stamping
by a manager with no real intervention into decision making might
be sufficient to render art 22 nugatory. What constitutes “enough”
interaction by a human such that art 22 is not triggered remains
an unclear issue in the GDPR, and may vary from member state to
member state (see [2, 53]). Secondly, art 22 does not require consent
from the data subject if the decision is “necessary for entering
into or performance of a contract between an organisation and
the individual” (art 22 (1)(a))14. Could submission to an AHS ever
be “necessary” for entering the contract of employment? It seems
prima facie unlikely but an employer might argue eg triage when
many 1000s of applications are received does not just benefit from
but actually requires solely automated systems.
If the right to object under art 22 is excluded by the lack of
a “solely automated” decision, then any “right to an explanation”
13See ICO guidance on the GDPR and DPA 2018 at https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/rights-related-to-automated-decision-making-
including-profiling/,
14A second exemption relates to where the decision is authorised by member state or
EU law. This refers to governmental “public tasks” and it seems unlikely it could ever
apply to an AHS.
read from art 22 may also fall. However it is possible, though also
controversial, that such a right may then be derived from art 15(h)
which provides that users have a right to information about “the
existence of automated decision-making, including profiling” (so
the use of an AHS in hiring has to be notified to candidates) and
“at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic
involved” [53]. It can be argued that the use of the phrase “at least”
means that semi-automated decision making may not exclude the
right to “meaningful information” [53]. Again such a right need not
be chained to proof of bias, or failure to mitigate bias, and yet could
prove highly effective in exposing discriminatory or even simply
arbitrary or erroneous practices, at an individual and possibly even
at a group level, given the possibility for collective redress actions
within the GDPR (see arts 80 and 82). Thus at this point an easier
route to disincentivising bias in AHSs might, in the EU context,
be seen as coming via DP rather than equality rights - especially
given the probable difficulty of building in bias mitigation into
AHSs definitively capable of meeting EU legal standards. It is also
worth noting here that any machine learning system is likely to be
regarded as “high risk” processing requiring a prior Data Protection
Impact Assessment (DPIA) (see art 35(3)(a), which should show
inter alia that potential for unfairness and bias had been considered
and steps taken to avert. This might arguably be seen as implying
a requirement for debiasing in AHS tools deployed in EU (see also
[5] for a similar point in a US context).
However, even if a right to algorithmic transparency does exist
in the solely-automated hiring context, what does it practically
mean? This has again been the subject of much academic debate.
Selbst and Powles argue, for example, that for a right to “meaningful
information about the logic involved” to be (sic) meaningful, it must
be more than a simple regurgitation of source code [44]. The A29
Working Party recommend that the data subject should be provided
with “general information (notably, on factors taken into account
for the decision-making process, and on their respective ‘weight’ on
an aggregate level) which is also useful for him or her to challenge
the decision” [17]. To date there has been no relevant case law in the
UK and the provision is not expanded on in the Data Protection Act
(DPA) 2018 which implements the GDPR in the UK (in comparison
to some other member states such as France).
6 DISCUSSION
The computational and legal challenges of AHSs that we have
outlined here raise significant concerns for tackling discrimination
and providing transparency to enable challenges to AHS hiring
decisions in the context of the UK. This is particularly pertinent as
bias mitigation in hiring is one of the key selling points for several
of these tools. They are part of a growing ‘diversity, equity, and
inclusion’ (D.E.I) industry that has boomed in the last couple of
years [60]. Whilst a few of the companies developing AHSs provide
some documentation to evidence such claims, access to relevant
information remains a key problem for conducting any thorough
analysis. Claims and validation are often vague and abstract, if
they are provided at all. Moreover, it is not clear how relevant
stakeholders, not least job seekers, are able to access and understand
information about how decisions about their eligibility might have
been reached through AHSs. This makes it difficult to assess if and
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how discriminatory practices might have been part of the hiring
process, and leaves little room for anyone to challenge the decision
made. Given the transparency rights attributed to data subjects by
the GDPR, this haziness as to transparency is unacceptable in the
EU and UK. On the other hand, what approach to transparency is
required by EU law, remains itself vague. It would be good to see
AHSs built in, or sold into the EU market meeting this challenge
of “meaningful information” explicitly. Might it take the form of
the counterfactual explanations which have become fashionable
but actually offer little by way of practical remedies? [56] What if
vendors say that greater transparency is simply not possible? Again
we may be back at a conclusion that such systems simply cannot
be lawful in the EU.
The AHSs we have looked at in this paper are relatively unique
in providing some information about their workings, even if the
exact data sources and model remain obscure and will vary accord-
ing to different clients. In particular, in seeking to explicitly tackle
issues of discrimination in hiring practices, these systems provide
some insights into how such issues are understood and approached
by AHSs. This is significant, and welcomed, as it provides an op-
portunity to engage with what could be considered as emerging
standards in managerial techniques that are being exported to a
global marketplace.
Whilst a desire to address the prevalence of bias and discrimi-
nation in hiring is a significant pursuit (not least in the context of
the UK where levels of discrimination against ethnic minorities in
accessing jobs have remained relatively unchanged since the 1960s
[46]), the approaches to bias mitigation provided by the three AHSs
we have looked at come with important limitations. Here, we are
not attempting to provide a comprehensive list of the issues that
might come with the use of AHSs in general, but want to summarise
a few of the key points that emerge from the evidence base we have
provided in this paper. First, attempts at mitigation within AHSs
run into on-going concerns with computational fairness. These re-
late not only to the inherent problems with data-driven predictions
and with relying on quantification for determining criteria of ‘good’
or appropriate ‘fit’, but also to the necessary reductionist nature
of group identification in computational systems and the neglect
of intersectionality that have also been the subject of significant
criticism in legal understandings of discrimination.
Secondly, attempts at bias mitigation in AHSs within a UK con-
text also show problems with accountability. When such technolo-
gies are used for decision-making, to whom are the companies
making AHSs responsible? The employer or the candidate? The em-
ployer might argue that some types of transparency are sometimes
undesirable, as indeed might the software company defending its
intellectual property. Thus, the question is whose job it is to fulfil
the obligation of transparency alongside the obligation of bias miti-
gation; the system builder, the employer who utilises it, or another
actor altogether.
Connectedly , the transfer of AHSs developed within a US socio-
legal context to a UK (and arguably EU) context introduces a number
of fundamental legal problems of fit, not just with regards to dis-
crimination and equality law, but as we have argued, perhaps more
significantly in relation to DP law. GDPR transparency rights in arts
15 and 22 may provide avenues to overturn aspects of the candidate-
employer information asymmetry and might even outright prohibit
the use of AHSs for wholly automated decision-making in hiring.
Yet these rights may be ignored or ill-implemented in systems not
built within the EU.
A number of other points might be addressed in future work.
US literature on bias, especially racial bias, in the algorithmic work-
place focuses on hiring because the US in general has “at will” firing
with few legal constraints [6]. In Europe and in the UK specifically,
things are very different and a quick survey of Employment Ap-
peal tribunal cases shows most revolve around firing or issues of
in-work conditions. There is a real need in extending FAT work on
algorithmic bias in the workplace to Europe to consider these other
loci for datafication, bias and opacity. Furthermore, more work is
needed looking specifically at systems developed in the UK and the
EU that also connects these to the actual practices and experiences
of employers and candidates to get a sense of how AHSs shape
those interactions. Such work requires more qualitative research
that we seek to pursue in future project work.
In conclusion, the lack of information about how AHSs work,
the approach they take to tackling discriminatory hiring practices,
and crucially, where and how they are used around the world is
therefore a significant problem. Given it is not even clear that AHSs
provide significant benefits to employers [17], it could even be
asked if their use should actually be restricted or discouraged by
regulators from the EU data protection and equality sectors. As this
trend is set to become more pervasive, there is an urgent need to
assess if and how AHSs should be used so as to uphold fundamental
rights and protect the interests of candidates and employees.
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